We consider the problem of dyna.mic flow control of a.rriving packet,s into an infinitme I>uffer. The service ra,t,e inay depend on the sta.te of the syst,eni, may cha.nge in time and is unkiiowii t,o the controller. 
eiivironnient.; hIa.soii ancl Girard [9, 101 consider routing inotlels; Shenker [12] st,udies the problem of opt.intal service alloca.tion to several users. I<alai aid %miel [5] consider a. problem in networks that yield a coop er a. t i ve gam e.
The main aiin of this paper is to show how met,liocls l n w t l on Rlarkov gaines (also known a 5 stochast.ic gatiies) 111a.y he a.pplied t.o dynamic control in qiicxiciiig iictworks u t i h a. min-rnas criterion. We c.otisitlw a. c.oirt.rol probletn with a single controller, \vlio ront.rols tlytiamicall; t.he flow of a.rriving pa.ckets iiii,o ail i n f i i i i t t bufltr. \Ye assume that tlie service rate rtiay depend on t.he st.at,e of tlie system, and m a y cliaiige in tin-ie in a. way that. is unknown t,o t.he controller. The god of t.he controller is to design a.n efficie ti t. policy iv h ich gua ra.nt,ees the best perforinance u i i d e r t,Iw worst, service conditions. The cost is coin-1)osed of a Iiolcling cost., a cost for rejecting cusloiners and a cost, t.1ia.t depends 011 t,he qua.lity of the service. Since tiot,liing is known 011 the behavior of the server. a. p i tit ist.ic a.ssiiinpt,ion is used that, regards bhe server i t s il playc:r i t i a. service fails the customer remains in the queue). Tlic value of 6, which may represent the quality of service.. may change in each time slot, and is not known to player 2. The objective of player 2, to be clescril)t.tl below, is to find a best strategy under the worst. case service conditions. We model the system a s a zerosum Markov game, where player 1 controls the servict) quaIity.
Actions U and b are assumed t.o be taken iiidel)i~ii-dently, based on the information on the current s t a t c b as well as tlie information of all past states and act ioiis of both players.
We assume that a customer that eiiters an eiiipty system may leave the system (with the prohatilily b )
at tlie end of this same time slot.
Let S t denote the number of customers iu tlir syst8em at time 1, t N, and Bt and d41 dcnote t Iir itctions of players 1 and 2 respectively. The stat^ space.
is denoted by X = {0,1, ...}. Let. A I ( } ' ) be the svt or probability measures 011 R set, Y.
The transitmion law q is:
a b + S r , i f c z 1 , y = . r ; ab, -i f c > U , g = . r + l :
We define an immediate payoff for all c E X, a E A and 6 E I3. C'(c,b, cl) is t 1 1~ cob1 that player 2 pays to player 1 when the stat(' ib .I*. and tlie actions of the players are 6 and a. C ' ~P I I C Talizes a cost frequently encountered in tlie literat iirv 011 flow control models. In (1) ti(") is called the <-discount.ed aofue of the game, due to the saddle point property described in Proposit ion 1 (ii). A policy of a player is said to be st,ationary i f it depends only 011 the current state (and not on the 1)rrvious history nor on the time). For stationary policivs 11 a n d 1: of the two players we sliall denote (with soiiie abuse of notation) 11,. = { u s ( l ) , u1(2)} E M ( B ) ,
wliere zcr(i) is tlie probability that t,he first player chooses bj a t state e; and U, = { u t ( 1 ) , v I ( 2 ) } E d l ( A ) , where w z ( i ) is the probability that the second player cliooscs ( I , at. state x.
It call he SI~OIYII tsliatn the problem Qt becomes trivial when j 2 U. In that. case, the optimal action of player ' L is always 1.0 choose cl?. Siniilarly. if B 5 0 t I i ( w it is optinlal for player 1 always to choose b f .
Prclilniiiary Results
Let h' he the sixt. of all real-valued functions j : { -1) U X -IR that are polynomially bounded and satisfy
r . i . j , f ) : = E [ f ( S t + l ) l S t = C , B~=~~, A~= U , ]
\VI' gct lor x E x: 
! / ( J ; , l S j ) -g ( . c , 2 , j )
if!/(.r-l. I ) -! / ( . r , ' L , I ) L ! / ( . r , 1 , 2 ) -g ( x , 2 , 2 ) f o r
\\.v .;hi111 Sa\-. t.liat. j E h: sat.isfies:
is c o~i v (~x iiicreusiiig i u .c; equivalently, for , . we note that. S ( O , i , j , f ) = S ( -l , i , j , f ) by dvfiiiit,ion, and hence it. suffices to show that. S( 1, i , j, J') -S(0, i , j , f) 2 0. This follows easily from t hc fact t linl f is increasing. 
